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REPORTS OF CASES 
DE'fERMINED IX 
THE SUPREl\1E COURT 
01<' 'fHE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
[47 C.2d 11; 300 P.2d 831] 
[L.A. No. 23679. In Bank. Aug. 17, 1956.] 
NATHAN H. SCHUR, INC. (a Corporation), Plaintiff and 
Respondent, v. CITY OF SANTA MONICA et aL, De-
fendants and Respondents. 
ROY C. TROEGER et al., Appellants, v. CITY O:F' SANTA 
MONICA et al., Respondents. 
Licenses-Application for and Issuance-Declaratory Relief.-
In an action for declaratory relief against a city and its police 
chief wherein a supplemental complaint alleged that plaintiffs 
had applied for renewal of their licenses for the conduct of 
amusement games, that such application was refused, that the 
city council, at a public hearing demanded by plaintiffs, found 
their games were not a violation of the state gambling laws, 
and that notwithstanding such finding the police chief still 
refused to issue the licenses, the trial court improperly refused 
to review the city council's determination. 
Gaming-Licenses-Issuance-Injunctive Relief.-·In an action 
for declaratory relief which was basically one to enjoin city 
officials from possibly committing a crime by issuing licenses 
for gambling games contrary to state law, although it was also 
asked that they be restrained from expending city funds in 
issuing these particular licenses, a judgment declaring that the 
games were contrary to state laws could not stand because the 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Licenses,§ 35; [2] Gaming, § 3; [3] 
1\funieipal Corporations, § 478; [ 4] Appeal and Error, ~ 90. 
( 11 ) 
issues are limited. 
Appeal-Persons Entitled to Appeal.-A plaintiff in one action 
uu'''wcu• rendered in another action which 
issued to him is ag-
uu,,m,,u" rendered in the 
"vrr~vuu<tct:u for trial. 
of the Superior Court of Los 
Swain, Judge. Reversed. 
and relief. 
in second Schur action, and judgment 
action, reversed. 
Bowman and Thomas W. LeSage for Appellants. 
for Hespondents. 
,J.~Nathan H. Schur, a corporation, commenced 
the of Santa Monica and its police 
the first it asserted that an ordinance of said city, 
hereinafter was unconstitutional in limiting the 
be issued for conducting games of skill to 
inhabitants. In the second action it 
4226 of the code, infra, is invalid 
laws in the 
the city 
Troeger, and fh-e other action 
called the Troeger the its 
and police chief alleging that are the holders of 
licenses granted by the for the conduct 
; that they have submitted for the annual 
renewal of their licenses with the police chief but that he will 
their applications on the that their 
gambling proscribed the Pl'Ilal 
operated by them are of skill and not 
gambling laws but that a dispute exists them and 
on tl1e subject. They ask for a declaration of their 
that it be ordered that the licenses be issued to them 
the city and its officers be enjoined from with 
businesses. 
The two Schur actions and the Troeger action consoli-
for trial but the consolidation was vacated as to the 
Schur action because of the result the court 
and did reach in the second Schur action; that 
ordinance was valid but the games licensed and TIV()YO,()CL>rt 
licensed were a violation of the law aside from the claim of 
made in the first Schur action. the 
Schur action is still pending and not 
importance here. 
Prior to trial and after motion therefor 
D'r'""''''"rl in that action, Troeger filed a 
which it was alleged that the police chief had denied 
applications for a renewal of their licenses that a 
and regular public hearing after due notice was 
had by the city council in which evidence was taken and a 
J!J 1\'A'!'l!AN IJ, lsc. 1:. Crn o< 8ANTA MoNICA 147 C.2d 
reporter was and the council found that plaintiffs' 
games were not a violation of the gambling laws of the state 
and were entitled to licenses; that notwithstanding such 
finding the police chief still refused to issue the licenses. It 
\YHS further alleged that evidence was introduced at the hear-
and Kathan Schur, the principal owner of Nathan Schur, 
appeared at the hearing and testified in opposi-
tion to 'rroeger's applications for licenses. The allegations of 
the supplemental eomplaint were admitted at the trial. There 
is no dispute about the occurrence of the events alleged in the 
supplemental complaint. Troeger's offer to the court of a 
transcript of the hearing before the council was refused and 
his request that the court review those proceedings was denied. 
Over his objection evidence was received on the question of 
whether the games were of skill or a violation of the Penal 
Code antigambling laws. 
In its findings the court found Schur's allegations in its 
second action to be true except that the ordinance (city code 
section 4226) was valid; that the games for which licenses 
were sought by Troeger were of chance and violated the Penal 
Code; that the expenditure of public funds by the city in 
licensing the gambling games for printing, preparing and 
filing applications for licenses and wages for "administering 
such games" was illegal; that the city police chief lawfully 
refused licenses to Troeger and his coplaintiffs. The judgments 
declared the rights as found and enjoined the city "from ex-
pending . . . any public funds of the City . . . in the licens-
ing· of any said gambling games played or operated in viola-
tion of Chapters 9 and 10 of Title 9, California Penal Code; 
and said defendants . . . are . . . enjoined from expending 
or disbursing any public funds of the City of Santa Monica, 
for the printing, preparing, issuance, or filing of applications 
for permits or licenses for any of said gambling games played 
or operated in violation of Chapters 9 or 10 of Title 9, 
California Penal Code"; and that Troeger take nothing. 
Troeger appeals from the judgment in each action, the 
second Schur action and Troeger action. At the trial of the 
consolidated actions the trial court heard evidence on the 
question of whether the games for which licenses were sought 
by Troeger were of skill or gambling. It refused to review 
the transcript of the hearing and finding of the city council 
which was set forth in Troeger's supplemental complaint. 
Section 4226 of the city code of ordinances provides: "No 
person shall keep, conduct or maintain within the City any 
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room, apartment or place used in whole or in part as a 
where any game not mentioned in Section 330 or 330a 
the Penal Code of the State of California, is played, con-
dealt or carried on with cards, dice, balls, billiard 
pool balls, cues or other device when chance is the 
predominate or a substantial factor in determining any winner 
of such game or any portion, part or phase of such game and 
when for the winning of such game or any portion, part or 
thereof, any person received in any manner, money, 
e;hecks, chips, credit or any other representative of value or 
any merchandise or anything of value; nor shall any person 
conduct or maintain within the City any house, room, 
apartment, or place used in whole or in part as a place where 
any game not mentioned in Section 330 or 330a of the Penal 
Code of the State of California is played, conducted, dealt 
carried on with cards, dice, cues or other device when 
skill is the predominate factor in determining the winner of 
such game, except such games of skill accommodating not 
more than 50 players or participants at any one time and for 
playing of such game is paid in advance, and where the 
or award to any person for winning any such game 
any portion, part or phase thereof consists only of mer-
chandise not exceeding $25.00 in value.'' Section 6122 pro-
vides that any person required to obtain a license to engage 
business "shall first obtain a permit to conduct such 
business from the Chief of Police. In order to obtain such a 
permit, a written application shall be filed with said Chief of 
Police, which application shall contain a statement of inten-
tion as to the location and extent of the premises to be 
occupied, and in addition such application for a permit to 
engage in any business licensed pursuant to Section 6207 of 
Code shall contain the name of any person financially 
interested in the business in any manner. The Chief of Police, 
within a reasonable time after the submission of such appli-
shall ascertain that the proposed location is within 
legal limits for such purpose, and that the purposes for 
which the prem,ises are to be used will not be in conflict with 
laws of the State of California . ... When satisfied that 
there is no apparent danger to public health and safety of the 
of the City, that the applicant, its officers or agents, 
any, are morally responsible and have a good reputation, 
that the conducting of such business in such location will be 
.conformance with all laws and ordinances, the Chief of 
Police shall issue a permit to said applicant. Such permit 
MoNICA [47 C.2d 
error in not reviewing the determination 
in accordance with the holding of this 
Inc. v. Hoover, 39 Cal.2d 260 [246 P.2d 
not concerned with the original complaint in 
action or with whether relief could have been 
thai beeause as shown by the supplemental 
followed the prescribed administrative pro-
to them. They were applicants for licenses 
They applied to the chief of 
refused. They then demanded 
by the city council with the 
All was done in accordance with 
which required the denial of a license if the 
sought to be licensed violated the state 
In the Fascination case, supra, the 
contained substantially the same provi-
rc•Q..-,p,n"t to licenses for games as do the city ordi-
vYe there held that such laws called for a hearing 
fJU'ccn<vu for the license by the city officials; that 
the license a review by mandamus may be had 
which the question was not whether 
the state Penal Code but whether the 
officials was sufficient to support their 
acted on the applications 
remedies. 'I'hey 
appears from their supple-
inasmuch as local officials 
the review did not 
is made of 
should have reviewed 
council as we held 
it refused to do, and, there-
action must be reversed. 
in second Schur action presents a 
different It will be recalled that the persons named 
Schur as those who had had licenses issued to them were 
iu the action. Basically the 
officials from possibly committing 
licenses for gambling games contrary to 
it was also asked that they be restrained 
'"-~~"c,,,cucn"' the funds involved in issuing these partie-
and that is as far as the judgment went in 
it did declare the games were 
We believe that judgment cannot 
stand because the were vested with authority to 
make the determination and the method of relief there-
from was a review of their action without taking independ-
evidence on the ; that unless the conduct 
!JLcuuc;u of a nuisance as declared by the Legis-
will not it even if it constitutes a crime, 
tribunal for the enforcement of the crimi-
nal law is the court in an appropriate criminal proceeding. 
[3] It is true that a taxpayer may obtain preventive relief 
against the illegal of funds by a municipal cor-
poration. (Code Civ. § 526a; Simpson v. City of Los 
40 CaJ.2d 271 P.2d 4.64] .) 
There appears to be no reason, however, why a municipal 
with Yalid to do so, holding a public 
determination with ref-
license to engage in a certain 
to its action in a trial 
one attacking its determi-
of the for a license. 
·with the power of determination 
reviewable mandamus or cer-
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tiorari in which the issues are limited as set forth in Fascina-
tion, Inc. v. Hoover, supra, 39 Cal.2d 260. Here there was 
a public hearing on the precise issue, whether the games for 
which licenses were sought violated the Penal Code, and due 
notice was given to all concerned which would include a tax-
payer. Moreover, Schur, the taxpayer, participated in the 
hearing. lV irin 85 497 P.2d 
470 J' is not to the . rrhere no local authorities were 
vested with valid authority to determine whether a person 
was entitled to a license. Here the local authorities were 
so vested and Schur participated in the hearing before the 
council. Its relief is limited as is Troeger's to a review of 
the action by the hearing body . 
.As heretofore seen, the Schur action is basically one to 
enjoin the alleged commission of a crime. In People v. Lirn, 
18 Cal.2d 872 [118 P.2d 472], the court held that although 
gambling places were nuisances under the common law they 
could not be abated unless made such by statute. There the 
district attorney was seeking to halt games by proceedings in 
court. The court said at page 876: "\Vhile these cases 
indicate that gambling houses were recognized as public nuis-
ances in criminal prosecutions, they do not hold that an 
equity action on behalf of the state might be maintained at 
common law to enjoin the operation of a gambling house. On 
the contrary, it is clear that the jurisdiction of equity was 
very sparingly exercised on behalf of the sovereign to enjoin 
public nuisances .... .An action on behalf of the state, 
therefore, to enjoin activity which violates general concepts of 
public policy finds no basis in the doctrines of the common 
law .... The courts of this state, however, have refused 
to sanction the granting of injunctions on behalf of the state 
merely by a judicial extension of the definition of 'public 
nuisance.' ... The courts have thus refused to grant in-
junctions on behalf of the state except where the objectionable 
activity can be brought within the terms of the statutory 
definition of public nuisance. Where the legislature has felt 
that the summary power of equity was required to control 
activity contrary to public policy, it has enacted statutes 
specifying that such activity constitutes a public nuisance 
"Which may be enjoined in an action brought on behalf of the 
state .... 
''Conduct against which injunctions are sought in behalf 
of the public is frequently criminal in nature. While this 
alone will not prevent the intervention of equity where a clear 
L'J( . 1'. Cl'rY OF S.\J\:TA ~\lOJ\: lCA ] n 
may be under the criminal 
to similar puni;;;hmeut for the same acts. For these reasons 
is loath to interfere where the standards of public 
can be enforced by resort to the criminal law, and in 
absence of a legislative declaration to that effect, the 
courts should not broaden the field in which injunctions 
criminal activity will be granted." (St>e Civ. Code, 
subd. 1; Intm·naf<ional etc. W orlcers v. Landowitz, 20 
Cal.2d 418 [126 P.2d 609] Caution should be observed 
therefore upon rt>trial to avoid violating that rule. It should 
be obserwd that whether licenses are or are not issued 
criminal law is still open to Schur. 
[4] Schur elaims its judgmrnt is not subject to review, 
but as heretofore stated, the actions were consolidated and 
rrroeger appt>aled from the Schur judgment which in effect 
licenses from being issued to Troeger. Troeger is 
thus aggrieved and may appeal from and have reviewed the 
Schur judgment. (See Kellett v. J1farvel, 6 Cal.2d 464 [58 
P.2d 649]; Wolfson v. Beatty, 118 Cal.App.2d 392 [257 P.2d 
. ) 
The judgments in both the Schur and Troeger actions are 
reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, ,J., Schauer, ,J., and McComb, J., con-
enrred. 
